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INFLATION, PRODUCTION, EXCHANGE RATES,
WAGES, INTEREST RATES: 1987-88
I . Inflation
1. Measured by the Cost of Living index 1 9 8 6 / 8 7 inflation is likely to be of 
the order of 35%•
2. Set against a probable increase in the cost of foreign currency of 4l2g/6 
over March 1986/June 1987 (375% against the USA $, 50% of basket non $,
dollar itself depreciating 20% against rest of basket) the parallel COL
rise of 50Í (including March-June 1986) is strikingly low.
3. a. Does this mean devaluation has and will continue to have minimal
effects on COL?
b. Have there been special features damping inflation in 1986/87?
c. Can such special factors be repeated or new ones developed in 1987/88
- 88/89?
4. The first devaluation impact (March-June 150%) was heavily cushioned by 
the simple fact that most imported goods and close domestic substitutes 
sold at or near the parallel market not the official price at least at 
retail. (Fuel and producer goods were exceptions but do not directly 
affect the COL much).
5. Thus the July ’86 - June '87 increase in Sh cost of forex is 50% on $ and 
perhaps 55% on basket while COL increase is likely to be 35%- Even 
allowing for lags this suggests that the initial ’slack1 was 
substantially eaten up by the March-June 1986 rolling ’big sink'.
6. Further 1 9 8 6 - 8 7 has been marked by two pieces of good luck (certainly 
Tanzania was due for some!):
a. 1986 was a very good food harvest year following a good one and a
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prior run of six fair to bad ones. Retail prices of food suddenly 
resumed their seasonal pattern with falls in the third quarter and 
parallel market prices were - in grain - below official more often 
than not until well into the first quarter of 19 8 7;
b. the early 1986 petroleum price bust cushioned the transport cost 
impact of the ’big sink’ (and to the extent a cautious base price was 
used also provided a windfall, deflationary boost to government 
revenue).
7. This suggests a decomposition of 19 8 6 / 8 7 COL may be:
a. 40Í (basically food) 0+ = 4%
b. 20% (rents, local services, etc.) + 30% = 6%
c. 40% (manufactures, etc.) + 62j% = 25%
d. Total 100% + 35% — 35%
8. That is none too reassuring on implications of future devaluation as the 
62¿% is at or above July 1986 - June 1987 forex cost moves - albeit 
lagged ’big sink' impact makes it fatuous to argue these prices rose 
faster than devaluation because of the June-June forex price changes and 
will continue to do so.
9. The food price deflationary element cannot be counted on to continue. 
Over 1960-1978 food prices rose about as fast as/or slightly more than 
the COL even though food output per capita grew. (True real per capita 
personal consumption rose too but it is a goal to have it rise in the 
future too!) They rose erratically around that trend depending on 
weather.
10. In 1 9 8 7 - 8 8 assuming good (but not bonanza) food crops there is little 
reason to expect a food price increase (including embodied commerce, 
transport, interest) much below the overall rate of inflation.
11. The oil price will - in $ terms - be higher over 1987-88 barring quite 
unexpected developments. Admittedly, if a $20 bbl landed price is used 
in basic 1 9 8 7 - 8 8 calculations, that should - without bad luck - be 
sustainable over 1 9 8 8 - 8 9 as well so that the only petroleum price
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increases domestically will be devaluation offsets.
12. One chance for a breakthrough over 1987—88/1988/89 is manufactured goods 
prices. The conditions for a breakthrough are:
a. sharp increase in supply wiping out scarcity premium; and
b. squeezing distributor margins (and/or making distributors look for 
lower cost ways of doing things); plus
c. reduction of unit costs of fixed and semi-fixed components in cost 
structure by spreading over a larger number of units.
These are conditions met in food in 1 9 8 6 - 8 7 (where a and perhaps b were 
key and c secondary).
13. A second chance is in transport. Not much can be done on fuel side
(greater fuel efficiency is not attainable fast). But raising capacity 
and increasing volume a vehicle can handle a year (reducing down time) 
would hold down transport price increases. How:
a. more spares to get vehicles (especially buses and lorries) back on 
the road and keep them there;
b. getting railroad back toward 1970-72 levels of tonnage (especially on 
Mwanza - Dar and Arusha/Moshi - Tanga/Dar to reduce load on lorry 
fleet for long distance bulk haulage pushing lorries into secondary 
and rural haulage;
c. putting right at least worst roads (Dar - Arusha, Great North Road) 
whose present condition very sharply increases wear and tear on 
lorries.
14. Major progress on "a" should be achievable in both 19 8 7 / 8 8 and 1988/8 9.
On "b" the key bottlenecks (not all the factors presenting optimal
efficiency!) need to be identified. If these are limited track relaying,
better turnaround, a few more locos and wagons then something should be 
attainable especially on Mwanza (and by rail ferry Bukoba and Musoma) -
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Dar. The link line to North may require more substantial and time 
consuming rehabilitation. On "c" if worst stretches of Dar-Arusha/Moshi 
and Dar-Tunduma can be identified promptly and 19 8 7 / 8 8 - 19 8 8 / 89
rehabilitation focused on them some considerable impact should be 
possible in at least 1988/8 9. While it is a secondary issue nationally, 
coastal (to Mafia-Lindi-Kilwa-Mtwara) and lake (especially Lake 
Nyassa-Nyanza-Malawi as other two lake fleets have been rehabilitated) 
shipping is important to some regions re transport access and cost. (It 
can also prevent dissipating road resources on pretty dubious ventures 
such as all weather/all season trans-Rufiji link.)
15. More details on Para 12 appear below in separate section. They suggest a 
goal COL pattern for 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 - 88/89 of:
1986/87 1987/88 1988/89
Food (4051) 10% 20$ (8) 15% (6)
Rent/Services (20$) 30$ 40$ (8) 30$ (6)
Other (Mfg. etc. - 40$) 62¿$________30$ (12)______ 25$ (10)
COL 35$ 28$___________ 22$
That does assume wage and salary increases of the same order of magnitude 
as projected COL growth. As discussed in earlier papers that seems 
prudent on incentive, mobilisation, social fabric grounds. It also 
assumes 15$ 19 8 7 / 8 8 and 20$ 19 88 /8 9 grower grain price increases as 
1 9 8 6 / 8 7 has been above ’free market’ price. The assumptions do assume
1987 and 1988 are both at least average food harvests and that petroleum 
does not soar back to $25-30 bbl but the latter assumption is reasonable 
and at least 1987 food harvest prospects are good to quite good.
II. Exchange Rates
16. March 1986 - June 1987 forex prices in T Sh will have risen about 412$ 
(on assumptions in Para 2). Assuming 50$ domestic price increases over 
that period this is real increase of 275$. Inverted that is a 6 3 .5$ 
devaluation (real).
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17. On the relative price basis (which IMF uses) that devaluaton takes real 
rate back to late 1970s levels when Fund, Bank, Uncle Tom Cobley and all 
did not think it was seriously or unmanageably overvalued.
18. The problem is that this is a very crude way of calculating sustainable 
exchange rates. As more sophisticated Bank work shows, if terms of trade 
have deteriorated and/or export levels fallen exogenously then exchange 
rate becomes unsustainable at old real price relativities. As 1976-1987 
would if decent data were to hand show a 30 to 40Í t of t decline plus 
partly exogenous export falls, the present rate is not an "equilibrium" 
rate (whatever that may be) .
19. But the Para 18 case means Fund on its basic argument has no further case 
for rapid devaluation.
20. Bank does have a case but accepts (sometimes):
a. the time lags and elasticities for exports influence how much 
devaluation when is appropriate;
b. too rapid devaluation can rend social fabric, become self justifying 
(via inflation), create perverse expectations;
c. it is crucial to reduce real (i.e. inflation adjusted) government
bank borrowing and the rate of domestic inflation to make devaluation 
work.
21. Tanzania - ironically - has made the Para 20 case (even if intuitively
and approximately) for at least five years and has reduced real
government bank borrowing (indeed even nominal) and acted to contain 
domestic inflation. The 1984 experience of massive crop price
boosts/large devaluation/poor weather/no additional resource transfers 
creating bloody all beyond a boost in inflation and a reduction (which 
hardly required the other elements) in real bank borrowing which
demonstrates - per Para 20 - what isn’t very functional.
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22. This strongly suggests a sensible 1987-88 exchange rate policy would be:
a. sliding devaluation parallel to excess inflation (say 2% a month 
cumulating to 26% over year);
b. small real devaluations (say .75Í a month cumulating to 10% over 
year);
c. i.e. a June 15 '87 - June 15 '88 devaluation totally by 'slow sink* 
of 35Í odd. Actually as world inflation will not be 0Í, "a" is on 
the high side or allows for up to 31 to 33% COL rise.
This would avoid any price shocks and might break expectation of sharp
change in June ( 1983? 1984, 1986 is 3 of 4 past years so does create an 
expectation). Further, at 35% the import price boost would not be 
radically above overall inflation so would not be either an engine for 
raising it or a total brake on reducing it. Assuming the manufactured 
output increase identified as key is achieved, that plus devaluation
impact on import duties and resale of balance of payments input aid 
should keep government bank borrowing requirement low (and indeed return 
recurrent budget to surplus on some definitions).
23. This analysis strongly argues against a significant June 1987 one off 
devaluation. 10% as a tactical necessity to satisfy Bank/Fund would do 
little harm (or direct good) - more would be dangerous. Barring high 
export supply elasticities in the short run it won’t work. (The 35%
devaluation means average 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 export prices - abstracting from world 
price changes - will be on average 35Í higher in shilling terms allowing 
grower price increases of 30 to 40Í on export crops except coffee where 
world price has dropped and, perhaps, cotton where it did so in 1976 
though it has recovered a bit.) The time to try a one off 20% or more is 
at a point when (presumably manufactured) export potential able to sell 
if prices were 20% or more higher (to them) is available on a large 
scale. That is not 1987!
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III. Interest Rates
24. If present overdraft rates are - as seems to be the case - in the 20 -
25% range they should not be raised further. They are a singificant
factor in costs and raising them is inflationary. True, negative real 
interest rates are not optimal but if 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 - 1 9 8 8 / 8 9 targets can be
achieved then the rates will become neutral or positive in real terms in
1988/89.
25. Long term rates (Treasury and Investment Bank) are - presumably - now
badly out of line (below) overdraft. This in one sense doesn’t matter as
far as Treasury goes because funds are ’allocated’ and are from low (NPF, 
BOT, NBC current) interest cost funds. It is ’a bit’ unfair to NPF, 
POSB, NIC beneficiaries! With investment banks it creates a nuisance - 
any company which can borrow supposedly for fixed investment and 
substitute that money for NBC overdraft will profit. While this is one 
way to stay within IMF bank credit targets, it is also a way to divert
time to fiddling rules and to become confused as to what actually is
happening.
26. This suggests a least bad interest rate policy for 1 9 8 7 - 8 8 might be:
a. deposits 10% -  2 0 Í
b. overdraft 20% - 25%
c. Treasury 10% (T Bills/BOT Advances)
-20% (POSB, NIC, NPF long term stock)
d. Investment 
Banks 20Í - 25%
but that long term loans/stocks carry a proviso that rate in any year 
would not be over 2% above average (or identified ’standard’) 
overdraft rates in the case of investment bank nor above it at all in 
the case of Treasury.
#
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27. "c-d-e" would reduce short run fiddle incentive and reduce penalising of
POSB, NPF, NIC depositors/beneficiaries but also would prevent locking 
long term borrowers in to very high real interest rates if inflation fell 
to 10% which is - presumptively the medium term goal.
28. Up to a point this is a sideshow. But a switch to a realy orthodox IMF 
line of 35% deposits, 40% overdraft, 37s% - 42¿% long term loans and 
stocks would be dangerously inflationary.
IV. Wages and Salaries
29. Assuming that the Para 12-15 targets (manufacturing, transport, COL) can 
be met then 25% average wage and salary increases should be possible 
consistent with - say - 5 to 6% real GDP growth.
30. Given that 1986 awards were described as interim advances; that the 
Nsekela Commission Report has arrived (or is about to do so); that 
1986/87 COL seems likely to be 35% and that real wages have declined 
virtually continuously over 1975-1986 inclusive, there is an incentive 
(pay part time wages get part time work), a morale, a social fabric and a 
mobilisation/political case for being near the anticipated COL rise in 
1987/88 and at or above it in 1988/8 9.
31. This might suggest:
1987/88 1988/89
Minimum Wage 30% 30%
Higher Wages 20% 25%
Top Salaries 10% 15%
Average 20-22% 25%
That also assumes that income tax free band goes up with minimum wage and 
that the nominal values of tax bands are raised (in theory by 20 to 25% 
but to be safe perhaps 10% in 1987/88 and 15% in 1 9 8 8 / 8 9 with any larger 
adjustments to be offset by lower nominal upper wage and salary raises).
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32. This does halt minimum wage erosion and with a bit of luck provide some 
recovery. At higher wage levels it would limit decline in 1987/88 and 
perhaps cause a marginal real gain in 1988/8 9. At salary levels the 
best than can be said for it is that at least it is better than past ten 
years.
33. This is separate from the problem of excess, unusable government and 
marketing parastatal employees. Since one cannot count on rapid results 
and initial year severance costs probably equal savings whatever can be 
achieved in 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 (especially by changing replacement hiring from 
automatic to only on a modified "case made out" basis) should not be 
factored in to wage increses nor into budget balancing.
34. Excess employees in other enterprises (both private and parastatal) 
probably can return to being full time if output recovery at 10% a year 
in those sectors can be sustained for two years. (Unfortunately the 
counterpart to that is that their total nominal employment probably won’t 
rise by over 2¿% a year.) On incentive grounds a case exists for
reactivating Industrial (Wages) Tribunal in respect to incentive schemes 
and private sector wage bargains.
V. Production
35. Transport has been covered at Paras 13-14 above. Beyond that it needs 
field looking and seeing not desk studies (Dar desks are also desks). It 
is however factored into manufacturing here to the extent that vehicle
and rolling stock maintenance is manufacturing and a key constraint is
spares.
36. Manufacturing can (per Para 12) be used to reduce COL/increase welfare if 
an output spurt like 1 9 8 5 / 8 6 - 1986/87 in food can be achieved over
1987/88 - 1988/89.
37. To do this probably requires a focus on a selected list of industries 
related both to mass market demand and to substantial unused capacity 
which can be restored to use by more operating inputs and spares plus 
(especially for 88/8 9) minor rehabilitation.
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38. A possible list is:
a. Textiles
b. Vegetable Oil
c. Soap
d. Leather/Shoes
e. Dry Cell Batteries
f. Transistor Radios
g. Vehicle Repair 
and Maintenance
h. Bicycles
(khanga, kitenge, blankets, socks, sweaters, 
i.e. integrated cotton mills, blanket 
factories, Pattex.)
(oilseeds prices? more cotton-seed? Plus 
cheap imported cottonseed and groundnuts to 
press, refine in Tanzania.)
(what is bottleneck? Oils are now cheap, 
ditto tallow and there is massive, apparently 
useable, surplus capacity!)
(need higher hides prices to up tannery volume 
and feed into shoes - these, i.e. shoes are 
now shortest supply ever in Dar.)
(probably centred on National which has higher 
local content.)
(need imported spares plus inputs to raise 
tyre and vehicle battery output. Capacity 
appears to exist.)
(may be more rehabilitation and local input 
production lead time needed? Pressure 3hould 
be put on new partner.)
i. Cement (if there jLs a shortage beyond transport. Or 
is it need to get multiwall bag and sack plant 
output up?)
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j. GCI Sheet (this - like related pipe, aluminium sheet, 
aluminium cooking ware is pure imported raw 
material problem.)
k. Dishes/Utensils (glasses should be OK - kioo doesn’t need many 
imports. If ALAF has more ingot aluminium 
also OK. Plastic and enamelware demand and 
imported input needs ought to be looked at.)
1. Milk (there is an urban market which even if 
rehabilitated Mara cannot meet. Trying to get 
former maize food aid shifted to milk powder 
and butter oil to reconstitute might pay off.)
m. Sugar (assuming fertiliser, chemicals, fuel, 
irrigation and machinery spares can cause 
rapid 25% output boost. Needs study as some 
plants/estates need long term, major 
rehabilitation.)
n. Beer (a clear, high profile, fairly broad based 
demand. Lo-import and hi-revenue content. 
Good case for machinery spares, malt, 
chemicals, raw materials for crown corks, i.e. 
caps.)
o. Agricultural
Implements (jembes, pangas, axes, hand and ox ploughs,
etc. Basic need is imported steel and bolts.)
39. There are two more products on consumers’ key lists (judging by what 
surveys exist, e.g. rural Tanga Region and by random - in non-statistical 
sense - observation):
p. Kerosine (snag is that this is 100% import as refinery
at attainable capacity cannot meet demand.)
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q. Cigarettes (no donor will touch. Consumers do want them
and are evidently aroused when absent. They 
are - or were - a rural incentive good. 
Suggests more "own" forex for paper - not 
necessarily for filters - and box materials 
might have incentive, consumer satisfaction, 
revenue boost effects.)
40. Concentrating on this list does mean leaving some things out. One 
apparent gap - school books and exercise books - is apparent not real. 
The paper factory can import substitute and must start earning own forex 
with exports. The list is not perfect, needs checking but not doubling!
41. Not every plant or sub-product should be priority. The best initial 
criteria may (within product categories) be:
a. probable market size;
b. degree of present shortfall;
c. lowness of imported inputs plus spares to ex-factory value ratio;
d. availability of speedily reactiveatable surplus capacity.
42. Present unit cost may not be a very helpful guide on run down plants for 
years and years held far below capacity by import constraints. As Bank 
mission to Ghana suggested, reactivating products which have demand, 
significant value added and are not inherent losers first and looking 
harder at market tests when market is (subsequently) less distorted 
probably makes sense.
43. Built-in high import/output ratios (e.g. Morogoro Multifibre) or misuse 
of export plant for domestic market (e.g. Morogoro Shoe) do create strong 
presuppositions for not including those plants except on initial export 
revolving fund loans with later imports to be paid from exports (or the 
plants close).
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44. To launch such a manufactured goods price holding through output boosting 
operation probably needs $200-250 million forex a year for these 
industries in 1987/88 and 1988/8 9. This is not all additional. Target 
1986/87 was presumably $100-125 million.
1987/88 1988/89
Operating Inputs 125 140
Spares 50 35
Rehabilitation 25 75
Total 200 250
This would allow 10—12¿% output increase in 19 8 8 / 8 9 over 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 (after 
at least 15% in 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 over 1 9 8 6 / 8 7 and - with luck - 7sí 1986/87 over 
1985/86) . That could raise 1 9 8 8/ 8 9 output to 70Í of 1978 peak up from 
50Í in 1 98 5/8 6. A long way from any probable true equilibrium but 40Í 
from 8 5 / 8 6 to 8 8 / 8 9 which should damp down price increases.
45. Possible cash cost structure of a priority firm:
1986/87 1987/88 1988/89
Finance/Other Fixed 12¿ 13 14
Wages 10 13 165
Domestic Services 5 7i 11
Domestic Inputs 11 15 21
Imported Inputs 19 15 23
Maintenance/Spares 2\____________ 7____________9
Total Cash Cost 50___________ 70¿___________94Í
Output 50____________60___________ 72
Unit Cost 100__________ 117i (+17i*) 131 (11.7%)
(See Annex for Assumptions)
The cash cost per unit increases (17sí and 11.7% respectively) taking 
into account 25Í average annual wage increases and general COL increase 
assumptions of Para 15 (including 35% odd forex cost rise in 19 8 7 / 8 8 and 
25-30/6 in 19 88/8 9) are consistent with COL and real wage targets (and 
with restoring maintenance/spares to viable levels).
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VI. Summary
46. COL increase at ca 35% has been below forex cost boost of 50%. (June 15 
'86 - June 15 *87). (A fortiori 50% March *86 - June ’87 COL below 412¿% 
forex cost boost.)
47. This relates primarily to:
a. largely once for all cutting of gap between actual market (especially 
retail) and official valuation of forex content;
b. breaking scarcity premium in food with second good harvest in a row;
c. fortuitous fall in $ petroleum prices (and in $).
48. The 40% of COL closely linked to forex price and not affected by "b" 
probably grew faster (62¿% to 50%) than forex price over 1986/8 7 .
49. Therefore achieving - say 28% and 22% target COL increases in 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 and 
1 9 8 8/ 8 9 depends on:
a. getting key manufacturing and transport volume increases adequate to 
break shortage premium impact on prices;
b. careful management of exchange rate (avoiding both failure to adjust 
for excess inflation and also counter-productive 'dashes' for large, 
one off 'real' devaluations);
c. careful management interest rates primarily by pushing inflation down 
not interest rates up;
d. keeping real government bank borrowing low (under 3% of total
government spending).
50. Re exchange rate this implies continued 'slow sink' say 35% increase in 
forex price in 19 8 7 / 8 8 and 25-30% in 1988/8 9. As on comparative price
basis Tanzania is back to late 1970s real exchange rate, there is no
large export capacity to be 'liberated' rapidly by prices and these
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1 sinks1 give 10% odd real devaluation (forex price increase) a year there 
is no case for large, one off moves.
51. The above are roughly consistent with 25% odd annual average wage/salary
increases and 10% to 15% a year rises in nominal values of income tax
bands. That halts real minimum wage decline in 1987/88 and (on model in 
text) allows minimum and probably other wages to rise a bit in 1988/89 in 
real terms. Salaries still sink but less rapidly.
52. Targetted transport and manufacturing programmes requiring not
unattainable forex could achieve the output (in the case of transport 
capacity) increases to make model consistent. These are sketched in more 
detail in text.
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Annex to Para 45
Assumptions:
A. marginal creep in fixed and finance costs of 5 to 7% a year;
B. 25% average wage/salary/bonus cost increase per person plus 2¿% annual 
employment increase;
C. 1987-88 40% and 1988—89 30% increase in domestic service costs
(especially Tanesco, water) with 7-12¿% volume increase;
D. Domestic raw materials about 20% volume and price per year;
E. Imported inputs 35% (then 30%) price and 20% volume increase a year;
F. Spares and maintenance doubled real plus 40% price increase 19 8 7 / 8 8  
(maintenance personnel and firm capacity low) followed by 20% price 
increase and 8% volume increase in 1988/89;
G. Output increase 20% in 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 and in 1988/8 9.
